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Neoliberalism and Democracy – is there no alternative? 
 
Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (New York: Zone 
Books, 2015) ISBN: 9781935408536 
 
There exist, in the academy today, huge numbers of scholars opposed to neoliberalism. In 
university libraries are hundreds of monographs on neoliberalism, many (if not all) casting a 
critical eye over this concept, and its perceived deleterious effects on democracy and the social 
structures of modernity. All this has occurred because, in the words of one such volume, ‘we 
live in the age of neoliberalism’ (Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005, p.1). Nevertheless, what is 
often effaced in a great many of these volumes is a detailed consideration of exactly what is 
meant by ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘democracy’. Despite the centrality of the concept of 
neoliberalism to many critical works, many, like Saad-Filho and Johnston, find it ‘impossible 
to define neoliberalism purely theoretically’ (Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005, p.1). Nor are 
Saad-Filho and Johnston alone in this matter (Chomsky, 1999; Harvey, 2005). Likewise, 
democracy is a contestable and contested notion, which has varied meanings depending upon 
the individual writing about it (Agamben et al., 2012). Democracy means rule by the people. 
But who are the people, and how (if at all) does democracy operate for their benefit?  
 Wendy Brown’s Undoing the Demos is, first and foremost, a critique of neoliberalism 
and its impact upon democracy. In fact, this is the main strength of Brown’s argument in the 
volume, and the reason why Undoing the Demos is a welcome addition to the scholarly 
literature. It does not provide any blueprint or toolkit for activists wanting to challenge the 
status quo (Brown, 2015, p.28). Her critique of neoliberalism is not a call to rehabilitate liberal 
democracy, nor to specify a kind of democracy which can resist neoliberalism. Undoing the 
Demos makes clear that even if neoliberal policies were abandoned, this would not stop the 
undermining of democracy through the normative economisation of political life (Brown, 2015, 
p.201).  
 Undoing the Demos makes it clear that accepting the open and contestable signification 
of democracy is essential to the work (Brown, 2015, p.20). Crucial to Brown’s argument is not 
just that markets and money are corrupting or degrading an ideal ‘democracy’; rather, a form 
of neoliberal reason is converting the distinctly political character, meaning and operation of 
democracy’s constituent elements into economic ones (Brown, 2015, p.17).  
 In the book, ‘democracy’ is not contained in a particular form; rather, Brown insists on 
democracy representing political self-rule by the people (Brown, 2015, p.20). Brown’s aims, 
and concerns, are clear, namely to provide ‘a theoretical consideration of the ways that 
neoliberalism … is quietly undoing basic elements of democracy’ (Brown, 2015, p.17). Brown 
does identify certain key conditions of democratic existence: namely, limited extremes of 
concentrated wealth and poverty; an orientation toward citizenship as a practice considering 
the public good; and citizens ‘modestly discerning’ about the ways of the power, history, 
representation and justice (Brown, 2015, p.179).  
 What Undoing the Demos provides is both a theoretical construction of the nature and 
qualities of neoliberalism, and neoliberal reason (a distinct form of rationality which has 
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become preeminent today), as well as how that rationality has shaped ideas of justice, 
citizenship, ruling practices and democratic imaginaries. Through a novel way of constructing 
persons, neoliberalism is evacuating democratic principles, eroding democratic institutions and 
eviscerating the democratic imaginary (Brown, 2015, p.28). Both liberal and radical democratic 
ideas are threatened by this process (Brown, 2015, p.17), meaning the task to understand what 
this rationality is and how it operates all the more urgent.  
 
What is Neoliberalism? 
The first part of Undoing the Demos contends that neoliberalism is a distinctive mode of reason 
which produces subjects; it is, following Michel Foucault (a major interlocutor for Brown), a 
‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 2004). Neoliberal reason, for Brown, means both persons and 
states are judged against the model of a business, both persons and states are expected to act to 
‘maximise their capital’ through practices of entrepreneurialism and self-investment, and both 
become projects of management and economics (Brown, 2015, p.22).  
 In surveying the literature on neoliberalism, Brown argues that its critics tend to focus 
on four main deleterious effects: that neoliberalism leads to intensified inequality; the unethical 
commercialisation of things and activities considered inappropriate for marketisation; the ever 
growing intimacy of corporate and financial capital with the state; and the economic havoc 
caused by finance capital (Brown, 2015, pp.28-30). Brown reads all these areas as 
consequences of neoliberal policy. Undoing the Demos focuses on different deleterious effects.  
 Brown joins Foucault in conceiving of neoliberalism as an order of reason, which 
becomes a governing rationality when in the ascendant, a rationality which extending a 
formulation of economic values and practices to every corner of human existence. This 
‘economisation’ is not necessarily monetary – rather, neoliberal rationality disseminates ‘the 
model of the market’ to all activities, configuring human beings as ‘market actors, always, only, 
and everywhere as homo oeconomicus’ (Brown, 2015, p.31). what makes neoliberalism 
distinctive for Brown is that homo oeconomicus is financialised human capital. Its project is to 
‘self-invest’ to ensure its value is increased and investors are attracted (Brown, 2015, p.33). 
Human capitals do not pursue the good life, but rather are constrained by the market (Brown, 
2015, p.110). We become entrepreneurs of the self, seeking to maximise returns on our 
investments (Foucault, 2004, p.226). 
 This economisation of subjects by neoliberalism is distinctive for Brown in three ways. 
First, it means that we are everywhere and only homo oeconomicus. Second, that neoliberal 
homo oeconomicus takes shape as human capital seeking to strengthen its position and 
appreciate its value, rather than as a more traditional figure of exchange or interest. Third, the 
model for human capital is finance capital, and not only entrepreneurial capital (Brown, 2015, 
p.34). As such, Brown sees neoliberalism as having replaced exchange with competition as the 
market’s founding principle and basic good. This means that, for humans, we all have become 
little capitals competing with one another, rather than exchanging with each other. This means 
that citizens are no longer constituent elements of the state, but can either contribute to, or be 
a drag on, economic growth. The implications of this, for Brown, are grave indeed. This 
arrangement means inequality, not equality, becomes the medium for competing capitals. What 
is more, when there is only homo oeconomicus, the foundation for citizenship concerned with 
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public things and the common good vanishes (Brown, 2015, pp.37-39). The further implication 
of this for Brown is that as the state’s legitimacy becomes bound to economic growth, liberal 
democratic justice concerns recede (Brown, 2015, p.40). As human capital, homo oeconomicus 
is at once in charge of itself, and at the same time is a potentially disposable element of the 
whole (Brown, 2015, p.110) 
 
Neoliberalism Beyond Foucault 
It would be wrong to cast Brown’s construction of neoliberal rationality as Foucauldian in 
nature. It is certainly influenced heavily by Foucault’s work, but in important ways Brown 
seeks to move beyond and develop Foucault’s thought. Foucault’s conceptualisation of 
neoliberalism as an ‘art of government’ is used by Brown as a springboard for theorising its 
‘dedemocratising effects’ (Brown, 2015, p.50). Foucault saw neoliberalism as distinctive as it 
takes ‘the formal principles of a market economy and referring and relating them to, projecting 
them on to a general art of government’ (Foucault, 2004, p.131). The economy becomes model, 
object and project: it becomes the model for state conduct, the primary object of state concern 
and policy, and the marketisation of domains and conduct is the state’s main project (Brown, 
2015, p.62). This means that the economy actually comes to require state support, and becomes 
detached from the exclusive association with the production and circulation of goods. Brown 
traces how the marketisation of social relations involves an inversion of classical liberalism 
(Brown, 2015, pp.62-70): 
 Yet Brown is clear that she has had to move beyond Foucault, and she does so in two 
important ways. First, she notes that today, there are a large number of ways in which 
neoliberalism operates that Foucault did not or could not anticipate (Brown, 2015, pp.68-70). 
These include the crises precipitated by finance capital, the austerity politics ensuing from these 
crises, and the way in which governance transforms economic action so that managed subjects 
replace free subjects. Brown identifies Foucault’s conception of the political as being limited 
to sovereignty and juridicism. This leads Brown to the argument that Foucault did not connect 
his work on neoliberalism into its effects on democratic political life and citizenship (Brown, 
2015, p.74).  
 Contra Foucault, Brown argues that economics is today the science of government. The 
figure of homo oeconomicus is central to Brown’s revision of Foucault. This subject is 
subordinated to the goal of macro-economic growth, meaning its own well-being is sacrificed 
to these larger purposes. It is also forced to engage with a form of self-sustenance that meshes 
with the health of the economy (Brown, 2015, p.84).  
 Such a figure invokes another author who was influenced by Foucault’s writing on 
neoliberalism – Maurizio Lazzarato. Brown does not cite Lazzarato’s work in Undoing the 
Demos, and it is useful to invoke some of Lazzarato’s ideas and arguments here to complement 
Brown’s positions. In a vein similar to Brown, Lazzarato argues that neoliberalism has led to 
a new conception of work, ‘immaterial labour’. This labour creates immaterial products, ‘the 
informational and cultural content of the commodity’ (Lazzarato, 1996, p.133). This immaterial 
labour involves activities not normally recognised as ‘work’ – what Lazzarato terms ‘mass 
intellectuality’, which involves defining and fixing cultural and artistic standards, fashions, 
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tastes, consumer norms, and public opinion, and includes linguistic and intellectual activity 
(Lazzarato, 1996, p.133). 
 Likewise, Lazzarato’s recent work focusing upon how debt controls and orders every 
aspect of the lives of states and their citizens is an argument which complements Brown’s 
argument that the political sphere has become economised (Lazzarato, 2015; Lazzarato, 2012). 
Undoing the Demos could have usefully referenced these works to illustrate how others have 
similarly been influenced by and moved beyond Foucault in considering contemporary 
neoliberalism. 
 Brown’s second departure from Foucault is one which much literature has overlooked. 
Brown also sees the formation of human capital as altering roles of gender subordination. This 
occurs through the shrinking and privatisation of public infrastructure which supports families, 
children and retirees (Brown, 2015, p.105). The result of the shrinking of the public sphere is 
that the work and costs of supplying public services are returned to individuals, and 
disproportionately to women. The freedoms promised by the free market are, in fact, inverted 
into new forms of gender subordination as women remain providers of unremunerated core 
work outside the market (Brown, 2015, p.107). Throughout the social body women become 
responsible for provisioning care of every sort. They both require the visible social 
infrastructure that neoliberalism aims to dismantle through privatisation, and are the invisible 
infrastructure sustaining a world of self-investing human capitals (Brown, 2015, p.107). 
Gender was an area in Foucault’s work on neoliberalism which was left unspoken, and Brown’s 
interventions here are welcome in illustrating how the perceived neutrality of the market 
actually works to entrench division and stereotypes. 
 
Disseminating Neoliberal Reason 
In the second half of Undoing the Demos Brown engages with examples of exactly how this 
neoliberal rationality, in her view, has recast democracy, showing (drawing on examples) 
exactly how an economic rationality has become a governing rationality (Brown, 2015, p.121). 
Chapter Four explores how neoliberalism has mobilised and saturated the formulation of 
‘governance’, which reconceives the political as a field of management (Brown, 2015, p.127). 
Public life is reduced to problem solving and program implementation; democracy becomes 
purely procedural, and absent all concern with justice (Brown, 2015, p.128). Governance 
involves consensus policy-making, and stakeholders, guidelines, best practices and 
‘facilitation’; this, for Brown, is a depoliticising enterprise (Brown, 2015, p.131). Authority is 
‘devolved’ (which is not equivalent to decentralisation), but is a mechanism that allows large-
scale problems to be sent down the pipeline to small units unable to cope with them (Brown, 
2015, p.132). Through this process, the individual becomes doubly responsibilised – it is 
expected to fend for itself (and blamed for its failure to thrive) and expected to act for the well-
being of the economy (and blamed for its failure to thrive (Brown, 2015, p.134).  
 Brown draws on the reforms to Iraqi agriculture made by the Coalition Authority after 
the 2003 invasion to illustrate the deleterious effects of governance (Brown, 2015, pp.142-150). 
Paul Bremer, then head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, passed orders, based on 
agricultural best-practices, which led to Iraqi wheat farmers having to buy genetically modified 
seeds and specific fertilisers from multinationals. This resulted in the thousands of years of 
5 
 
sustainable wheat farming in the fertile crescent ending, and farmers became beholden to not 
just the multinational companies who had the patents on the seeds, but also to the volatility of 
world markets. Bremer’s aim was to ‘neoliberalise’ agriculture, and his orders did so, to ensure 
that any future democratic government would be constrained by competition and the market in 
their actions to help Iraqi agriculture (Brown, 2015, pp.149-150). The examples of Iraqi wheat 
growing is certainly powerful, but its invocation does potentially  
 In Chapter Five, Brown considers the way in which the law can disseminate neoliberal 
rationality beyond the economic sphere (Brown, 2015, p.151). Specifically, Brown considers 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, arguing that these decisions actively remake the 
demos, and show how popular power is eliminated from the democratic imaginary (Brown, 
2015, pp.153-154). The law thus recasts support for popular power as an unacceptable blockade 
in a free market. Foremost amongst these decisions is that of Citizens United v Federal Election 
Commission (2010). This split decision, decided 5-4, lifted restrictions on corporate 
expenditures for all types of election communications. Brown argued that it recast formerly 
noneconomic spheres, such as a political election, as markets (Brown, 2015, pp.155-156).  
 In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, deployed the language of 
civil rights to protect the speech of corporations (Brown, 2015, p.167). What Brown argues is 
that the decision, in its insistence that the corporation must share in the rights of man, its 
heralding of corporate speech as vital to democracy, and its jettisoning of concerns with respect 
of the effects of political speech, the Supreme Court subverted key components of liberal 
democracy, including popular sovereignty, free elections, political freedom and equality 
(Brown, 2015, pp.172-173). Every actor becomes case in market terms, and the court 
vanquished the political meaning of citizenship, erasing the distinction between economic and 
political orders which Brown sees as essential to even the most modest vision of popular 
sovereignty (Brown, 2015, p.173). by rendering government intervention as the enemy of 
freedom, the Supreme Court blended the flow of capital and speech into one system; this 
‘scorches the ground’ of any other democratic form, threatening to extinguish any conception 
of democracy where this would matter (Brown 2015, p.173). Brown certainly makes a 
persuasive argument here. The resistance shown by the US Congress following the death of 
Justice Scalia in February 2016, and President Obama’s attempt to nominate a more liberal 
justice to the court (Justice Scalia was in the majority in Citizens United), does illustrate the 
ways in which even potential government action to limit corporate speech has been recast as 
an affront to freedom.  
 In Chapter Six, Brown turns her attention to higher education. For her, broadly 
accessible and affordable higher education is one of the great casualties of neoliberalism’s 
ascendance in the Euro-Atlantic world (Brown, 2015, p.175). This casualty, Brown argues, 
threatens democracy itself. For Brown, citizens cannot rule themselves without understanding 
the powers and problems they are engaging with (Brown, 2015, p.175). In formulating 
everything in terms of capital, neoliberalism leads to public goods being increasingly difficult 
to secure, as citizens are considered consumers; democracy becomes something requiring 
technically skilled human capital, not educated participants in public life; subjects as self-
investing human capital are not concerned with acquiring the knowledge needed for intelligent 
democratic citizenship, and knowledge, thought and training are desired almost exclusively for 
their contribution to capital enhancement (Brown, 2015, pp.176-178).  
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 Certainly it is the case that Anglo-American universities have been recast in the model 
of the market. The capture of consumer markets (seen in the positioning of students as 
‘consumers’ that need capturing through recruitment) is now the main business of universities 
(Muldoon, 2012, p.68). The ‘neoliberal academy’ is one which increases tuition and degrees 
are valued in terms of their ‘worth’. In addition, norms and metrics for academic success, such 
as the Research Excellence Framework (REF) in the United Kingdom, are ‘unsustainable over 
time’ (Brown, 2015, p.193). All these changes are deleterious for Brown. University life 
becomes stratified. Academics, knowing that research enhances their own scholarly value as 
homo oeconomicus, focus their attention there, and not on teaching.  
 Brown’s defence of the importance of higher education is also likely to be received 
warmly. In arguing that just as democracy does not require complete equality, but cannot 
survive its opposite, the same holds true of an educated citizenry, Brown is evoking a long 
tradition of defending the ‘public good’ of universities. Her argument that the effects of the 
privatisation of higher education are felt most acutely on democratic citizenship (Brown, 2015, 
p.184), can be compared to Cardinal Newman’s idea of the university as a community of 
thinkers engaged in a free sphere of thinking, not for any specific end, but rather, as an end in 
itself (Newman, 1996). Likewise, Thomas Jefferson wrote that the purpose of a university was 
a civic one, and the students at such a school of learning would form the statesmen, legislators 
and judges of the future (Jefferson, 1984, pp.459-460).  
 Brown does admit that the twentieth century was a ‘golden age’ for public higher 
education (Brown, 2015, p.180). She aims, in a similar vein to other defenders of public 
education, for a defence of a liberal arts education. Brown argues that the history of liberal arts 
education in universities can be traced from the fourteenth century, and the extension of liberal 
arts education from the elite to the many was a ‘radical democratic event’ (Brown, 2015, p.185). 
This extension ‘articulated equality as an ideal’ (Brown, 2015, pp.186-190). Such twentieth 
century defenders of higher education like E P Thompson made similar arguments. Like Brown, 
Thompson saw the university as ‘a centre of free discussion and action, tolerating and even 
encouraging “subversive” thought and activity, [enabling] a dynamic renewal of the whole 
society’ (Thompson, 2013, p.166). 
 It is clear that Brown believes that democracy requires people who are educated, 
thoughtful and democratic in sensibility – and that this is what, for Brown, a liberal arts 
education long promised. Democracy hollowed out by neoliberal rationality cannot be counted 
on to renew liberal arts education for a democratic citizenry (Brown, 2015, p.200). However, 
universities have a long history as corporations, and have been enmeshed in delivering the 
economic policies of governments for centuries, even during the ‘golden age’ of the twentieth 
century (Frost 2015). Brown’s defence of liberal arts feels underdeveloped, especially in 
making the connection between a liberal arts education and a strong and prosperous democratic 
society. It is too easy to view the university as a refuge. Foucault himself wrote that universities 
are a form of mass media which should not provide a reserve for scholars threatened by modern 
capital and information flows (Foucault, 1997, p.326).  
 
Is Another World Possible? 
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Undoing the Demos stands as a powerful critique of neoliberalism. Perhaps the most interesting 
element of the book is the prologue. It is in the prologue that Brown stakes out the possibilities 
for challenging the dominant form of neoliberal rationality she sees in the world today. This 
form of challenge co-opts and subverts neoliberalism, and is based in the idea of ‘sacrifice’. 
Neoliberalism retains and transforms the idea of ‘citizen sacrifice’, transforming both state and 
citizen into serving the economy and fuses self-reliance with a readiness to be sacrificed for 
the benefit of the economy (Brown, 2015, p.212).  
 Sacrifice is premised upon a noneconomic and non-marketised form of exchange 
(Brown, 2015, p.215). Brown sketches two forms of sacrifice – religious and moral-political. 
Religious sacrifice is communal, ritualistic and oriented towards restoring order and harmony. 
Moral-political sacrifice involves giving up life (or an aspect of it), but what is given up is 
one’s own. The austerity politics of recent years has been, for Brown, drawn upon both 
religious and moral-political meanings of sacrifice.  
 Brown argues that the logic of sacrifice is external to neoliberal reason, working as a 
supplement to it. This supplementary nature of sacrifice carries the potential for breaking open 
neoliberal reason. Two features of religious sacrifice provide possibilities to Brown for this 
breaking open. The first is ‘substitution and displacement’, through which the whole 
community is called to sacrifice in order to save particular elements of that community. The 
second is ‘restoration’, through which the refusal to sacrifice in the face of neoliberalism might 
productively reveal other crises and, in so doing, might challenge their neoliberal form (Brown, 
2015, p.218).  
 How can this sacrifice be productive? Brown points to the anti-austerity protests in 
Europe and America as a struggle to revive the image of the nation as res publica , and of the 
people as a public body. These movements aimed to reclaim the political voice hushed by the 
figures of neoliberalism. The movements themselves represent a restorative form of religious 
sacrifice, which has at least the potential to challenge the prevailing wisdom that ‘there is no 
alternative’. These social movements, and the progress that they have made, may seem 
impotent in the face of global finance.  
 Yet Brown finishes Undoing the Demos with a view that ‘the Left’s’ predicament in 
not offering a realisable alternative future reflects a wider despair in Western civilisation 
(Brown, 2015, p.221). The ‘end of history’ has led to a malaise. Brown concludes that the 
Left’s political work is difficult, and bears no immediate reward, and has no guarantee of 
success. In this she is not alone. Leftist political theory, from Derrida, to Nancy, to Agamben, 
to Foucault, has always offered tentative forms of future political orders, not least to avoid 
offering programmatic forms of politics. In drawing our attention to the productive nature of 
sacrifice, Brown opens up a productive sphere for future research, one which hopefully will be 
developed by her and others in years to come. All we have is this work, which affords us a 
slight hope that things can be better. That is our alternative (Brown, 2015, p.222).  
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